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Abstract Solar Radiation Management (SRM) geoengi-
neering is a proposed response to anthropogenic global
warming (AGW) (National Academy of Sciences, 2015).
There may be profound – even violent – disagreement on
preferred temperature. SRM disruption risks dangerous
temperature rise (termination shock). Concentrating on
aircraft-delivered Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI),
we appraise threats to SRM and defense methodologies.
Civil protest and minor cyberattacks are almost inevitable
but are manageable (unless state-sponsored). Overt
military attacks are more disruptive, but unlikely –
although superpowers’ symbolic overt attacks may deter
SRM. Unattributable attacks are likely, and mandate use of
widely-available weapons. Risks from unsophisticated
weapons are therefore higher. An extended supply chain
is more vulnerable than a secure airbase – necessitating
supply-chain hardening. Recommendations to improve
SRM resilience include heterogeneous operations from
diverse, secure, well-stocked bases (possibly ocean islands
or aircraft carriers); and avoidance of single-point-of-
failure risks (e.g. balloons). A distributed, civilian-
operated system offers an alternative strategy. A multi-
lateral, consensual SRM approach reduces likely attack
triggers.
Keywords security, geoengineering, solar radiation ma-
nagement, SRM
1 Introduction
AGW is a primary challenge for the world, over the
coming centuries (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, 2013). Major ﬁnancial expense will be needed to
deal with the previously-unaddressed social cost of carbon
(Yang et al., 2018), and to address resulting physical,
geopolitical and social issues (Stern, 2006). Already, great
international and domestic negotiation efforts have been
made to make the political deals (United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, 2014) necessary to
restrict expected global temperature rises. Ongoing
difﬁculties experienced in completing a rapid transforma-
tion of world energy systems (to break links between
energy production and CO2 emissions) have resulted in a
revisiting of discussions of geoengineering–– as an
alternative or complement to the more traditional inter-
ventions of mitigation and adaptation. Geoengineering, in
its current usage, is ordinarily interpreted as meaning
deliberate modiﬁcation of the climate system.
There are two principal types of proposed geoengineer-
ing:
(1) CDR: a group of techniques described either as
Carbon Dioxide Removal, or (more generally) Greenhouse
Gas Removal (GGR) (Lomax, 2015). GGR includes
removal of secondary Greenhouse Gases (GHGs)
(methane, etc.), as well as carbon dioxide. CDR offers a
theoretically-complete solution to CO2 emissions – but
only if conducted rapidly. Delays in conducting CDR leads
to interim temperature increases, which can cause
permanent harm (e.g. extinctions). Cost is the major
barrier to CDR deployment at scale (a ﬁgure of 50 EUR/
ton CO2 is suggested by IEAGHG (Kornneef et al., 2011),.
(2) SRM: Solar Radiation Management works via
modiﬁcation of the Earth’s radiation balance, i.e. by
reﬂecting sunlight. Example SRM proposals include local
measures, such as crop albedo modiﬁcation and white
roofs. However, our concern is security – and the more
global SRM measures are therefore of much more
relevance, as their direct transboundary effect is likely to
be far more controversial. Two are seen broadly as
plausible: Marine Cloud Brightening (MCB), which
would be delivered from a ﬂotilla of small ships; and
Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI – replicating the
cooling following volcanic eruptions), which is delivered
from one or more tethered balloons, or from a number of
free-ﬂying aircraft. SRM does not constitute a complete
solution to emissions. First, it is temporary–– excepting
far-fetched technologies, such as space mirrors. Secondly,
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SAI also is imperfect in its climatic corrections. SAI
would, for example, lead to a global climate drier than a
pre-industrial climate with the same global average
temperature. Plausible methods of SRM are comparatively
inexpensive: It is climate and ecosystem risks, and political
controversy, that underpins the reluctance to deploy. N.B.
SAI is the most widely-discussed form of SRM, and
comments within this paper relate principally to SAI.
Large-scale geoengineering deployments have not yet
occurred, save for various afforestation (tree-planting)
programmes, and suchlike. However, various anthropo-
genic processes (e.g. particulate air pollution) have
inadvertent effects on climate – although lack the relevant
intent to qualify as geoengineering. In addition, many
necessary technologies exist only in theory – but
deployment is not generally regarded as posing insur-
mountable challenges (although some high-tech imple-
mentations are potentially problematic, e.g. space mirrors).
Geoengineering, therefore, exerts an increasing inﬂu-
ence on climate discourse and policy. More formally, CDR
is becoming deeply embedded in international agreements.
The recent Paris agreement relies on large-scale CDR in
the second half of the 21st century (Lewis, 2016). SRM, by
contrast, is not widely accepted as a policy instrument and
is not given prominence in the recent IPCC 1.5°C report
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018).
SRM geoengineering can be regarded as having an
ongoing annual cost. This is due principally to its
impermanence – and to dominance in the cost calculations
of chemicals, labor, and short-life or leasable equipment
(McClellan et al., 2012). McClellan et al. (2012) estimate
total SRM costs for global climate management at as little
as $2 billion per year. To give an idea of scale, this
potentially involves as few as 14 aircraft or as few as 4
bases (trade-offs exist). Notably, cost estimates and cooling
assumed may differ widely between different studies.
However, in all deployment scenarios, the costs remain
trivial when compared to the size of the fossil-fuel
economy. Notably McClellan’s costings do not consider
potential savings from drone deliveries–– an obvious
possibility, considering widespread current deployment of
military drones. As GHG levels in the atmosphere rise,
more aggressive interventions may be needed. Never-
theless, SRM’s total direct costs remain a negligible
proportion of global GDP.
Future deployment of geoengineering technologies may
be by commercial ﬁrms (Lockley, 2016a), or by states.
Likewise, two models for the future commercial purchase
of geoengineering exist–– depending on whether states or
private actors, are the customers.
The rapid cooling effect of SRM geoengineering is
reversible. Therefore, SRM by aerosol manipulation risks
‘termination shock’ if deployment suddenly ceases
(McCusker et al., 2014) – due to the relatively short
lifetime of SRM aerosols (Irvine, 2015). The more sudden
the termination of SRM, the greater the risks – as rapid
climate change is a direct risk factor for the biosphere
(MacMartin et al., 2014). Such a situation is potentially far
more damaging than would be the case if geoengineering
had not been commenced. Any security threats to SRM
operations may therefore risk dangerous termination
shock. The effects of termination shock differ over land
and ocean, due to mass transfer in the mixed layer of the
surface ocean.
Discussion of SRM in the literature primarily focuses on
two scenarios: state provision or regulation (Ricke et al.,
2013); and the rogue philanthropist (Victor, 2008) (aka
‘Greenﬁnger’). Some limited discussion of alternative
funding models can be found (Lockley, 2016b) (including
the use of SRM for the creation of Voluntary Carbon
Offsets (VCOs) (Lockley, 2016a). Our discussions below
are applicable broadly – although we make speciﬁc
comment on different potential providers, where relevant.
A considerable literature exists, concerning the role of
climate change in conﬂict. This sub-discipline already
beneﬁts from broad-reaching systematic reviews (Hsiang
et al., 2013), quantitative historical studies (Zhang et al.,
2007), and analyses which drill down into individual risks
(e.g. terrorism) (The CNA Corporation, 2007). The canon
encompasses retrospective analysis of conﬂicts (e.g.
Darfur (United Nations Environment Programme, 2007),
Syria (Gleick, 2014; Selby et al., 2017), Nigeria (Sayne,
2011), Somalia (Maystadt and Ecker, 2014)), and discu-
ssion of potential future ﬂashpoints – including considera-
tion of nuclear war (Scheffran et al., 2016; Mian, 2016).
However, much of the literature is focused on the role of a
changing climate on the frequency, likelihood or precondi-
tions for conﬂict (Scheffran and Cannaday, 2013; Schef-
fran, 2015; Christiansen, 2016;). Conversely, there has
been comparatively little attention given to the risk of
direct action (kinetic or otherwise) against climate-relevant
infrastructure (save some research on the occasional direct-
action civil society protests) (Schlembach, 2011). Para-
doxically, conﬂict over fossil fuels (Caselli et al., 2015) is,
of course, debated ad nauseum.
The study of geoengineering is a relatively nascent
discipline, and formal reviews have identiﬁed signiﬁcant
weaknesses in the scope of extant analysis of the
international relations aspects (Horton and Reynolds,
2016). Nevertheless, links between geoengineering and
geopolitics (Yusoff, 2013; Dalby, 2015), and between
geoengineering and conﬂict (Fleming, 2012; Maas and
Scheffran, 2012; Link et al., 2013), have received attention
(notably, this again includes a claimed potential role in
triggering nuclear war) (Robock, 2015). Nevertheless, the
speciﬁc risk of action (kinetic or otherwise) against
geoengineering control systems and institutions; infra-
structure; and hardware appears to have been given little, if
any, academic attention. That potential ﬂashpoint is the
subject of this paper.
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2 Discussion
Below, we extensively discuss hostile actors, threat types
and defensive strategies, as relevant to SRM security.
We generally consider only aircraft-delivered SRM
operations, while noting that other SRM technologies
(Shepherd et al., 2009) and injections methods (McClellan
et al., 2012) are available. However, we make brief
mention of some other technologies, where these are
particularly relevant. Furthermore, we consider only direct
threats to operations – while noting that SRM may trigger
wider hostilities, or even counter-geoengineering (the
deliberate release of GHGs, in response to an SRM
program) (Nightingale and Cairns, 2014). Issues of wider
international relations are beyond the scope of our paper.
To constrain discussions, we consider only security
issues relevant speciﬁcally to geoengineering. All normal
organisations and operations face a range of non-speciﬁc
threats (petty theft, fraud, hacking, etc.). Airports and
airbases additionally have a well-understood range of
security issues. Where these are not related to SRM
operations, we do not discuss them in depth. Because of
the highly heterogeneous combinations of deployment
loci, actor identities and geopolitical backgrounds, we
eschew formal analysis tools (threat matrices, etc.) which
would be cumbersome to generalize so extensively.
Instead, we take a discursive approach to the subject.
2.1 Threat actors and objectives
We consider a range of actors, with a potential interest in
disruption of operations: Civil society protests (including
social instability); terrorist groups; and states.
2.1.1 Civil society protests and social instability
Civil society protests are to be expected at the inception of
an SRM program – due to the controversial nature of the
technology. The extent and nature of these protests are
entirely undetermined, with a wide envelope of potential
scale and scope. Violence may occur, causing damage with
high economic impact (Lancaster and Mulaudzai, 2016).
Geoengineering activities have already attracted signiﬁ-
cant, often site-speciﬁc protests – which may have been a
causal factor in shutting some down (e.g. SPICE (Strato-
spheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering, 2018))
(Geoengineering Monitor, 2017). Bases are a natural
location to concentrate protests (Kidron, 2013), but civil
society groups often rely on numbers for effective protest.
Isolated airbases may be not only difﬁcult to reach, but
may also be in locations incapable of practically support-
ing a sustained protest population: e.g. deserts, etc.
Generally, consideration must be given to the political
and social stability of countries of operation. A history of
successfully managing any locally-common forms of civil
protest, without resorting to brittle authoritarianism, is a
desirable indicator for location selection.
A threat comparable to direct protest is social instability
– considered here as a general disruption to law and order,
continuously-functioning government, and the wider
economy. This threat is distinct, in that it does not need
to be directed at SRM operations to have an effect.
The local political environment is, therefore, a key
consideration, in managing both types of threat. Japan,
Switzerland, and Canada offer ready examples of major
countries with high political stability (The World Bank,
2015). Nevertheless, none are located well for geophysical
purposes (Australia is an obvious alternative, here). Many
stable states are better located, but these are typically much
smaller geographically and economically, and thus more
vulnerable to external inﬂuence: Tonga, Mauritius, Kir-
ibati, Macao, etc. Additionally, many are geographically-
isolated, which may increase operational costs. The World
Bank Index is not a solid proxy for suitability – with e.g.
Israel scoring low, despite having an intuitively-capable
situation and institutions for enduring strategic operations.
The Marsh Country Risk Index (Marsh LLC, 2018) is
another useful measure, which offers French Guiana
(technically part of France – although in S. America, and
notably home to a major spaceport), Chile and Malaysia as
countries which combine relatively good location, with
relatively low risk. A useful heuristic is to search for
countries which (when adjusted for their economy and
population) rarely make the global news – a bias to the
boring. Notably, political stability indices are likely
protective against both capricious governments and restive
populations – each of which offers its own proﬁle of threat
to SRM operations.
Speciﬁc to SRM, it is not unrealistic to expect that
protesters may direct their attentions to more accessible
targets – such as the political hierarchy, or potentially to
supply chain elements (BBC, 2008). Protests should,
therefore, be expected at a variety of locations. However,
these are much less likely to become an insurmountable
major security issue than they are to remain a political risk.
Serious disorder from environmentalists is rare, and
organized terrorist violence is virtually unheard of.
Nevertheless, the cost of security operations can be high
(Highways England, 1998).
Cyberattacks may be expected as a part of a modern and
sustained civil society protest (Raza, 2016) – although
these are likely to lack sophistication. Doxing attacks (i.e.
publishing conﬁdential information on personnel, to
compromise their privacy or security) (Quodling, 2015),
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) (Kiruthika Devi and
Subbulakshmi, 2016), etc. are likely to be the ‘weapon of
choice’ – rather than the committed and sophisticated
sabotage attempts necessary to materially directly disrupt
operations (such as that seen in the Stuxnet attack on Iran)
(Singer, 2015).
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2.1.2 Terrorist groups
Terrorism (and, by association, counter-terrorism (Ugorji,
2017)) lacks precise, agreed deﬁnition (Greene, 2017) –
but may include actions by both groups and lone actors
(Pantucci et al., 2015). Terrorists certainly have the means
to attack SRM operations. However, it is uncertain whether
they possess the will. With exceptions (e.g. animal rights
extremists (ADL, 2016)), modern terrorist groups often
seek to act ‘on behalf’ of a race, religious group, or other
populace. As a likely prerequisite for such terrorism, SRM
would have to be seen (perhaps incorrectly) (CGG, 2016)
as imposing a speciﬁc cost on a speciﬁc population that is
sufﬁcient to prompt such an attack. Of course, a terrorist
group seeking to harm a country carrying out SRM
operations for reasons unrelated to SRM could elect to
attack its geoengineering facilities – but there is no obvious
reason why this would be the chosen approach, particularly
bearing in mind that the risk of termination shock is borne
globally. Furthermore, other targets are far easier to hit –
notably concentrations of people in urban landmarks and
using public transport infrastructure. As time goes on (and
the risk of termination shock thus increases) the likelihood
of SRM being selected as a target of opportunity further
diminishes – as there becomes an increasing likelihood that
whichever group the terrorists claim to ‘represent’ will be
harmed in equal measure to the population of the country
operating or sponsoring the SRM operations.
However, should SRM be applied in such a way that a
particular group could be identiﬁed (rightly or wrongly) as
signiﬁcant losers, attack risk may be elevated. Terrorists
may be emboldened by the perceived injustice, and
perhaps supported (or not actively opposed) by a wider
group than may otherwise be the case. One might
postulate, for example, a scenario in which North African
Arab countries are perceived to be disadvantaged by a US
SRM program. This resentment could inﬂame existing
perceived discrimination, leading to disgruntled Arab
sympathisers or established terrorist groups selecting
SRM infrastructure or operations as a focus for attacks –
perhaps as one facet of a wider campaign of hostilities.
Two inevitable facts serve to increase the likelihood of
such attacks. First, while there may be a net global beneﬁt
from SRM, there will be relative winners and losers – both
perceived and real. Secondly, these losses (real or
imagined) will not exist in a political vacuum, and thus
have the potential to inﬂame existing tensions (Nightingale
and Cairns, 2014). Accordingly, a comprehensive defense
against terrorism may include diplomatic efforts to ensure
an equitable global settlement for SRM – including
compensating relative or absolute losers.
Finally, it merits note that an extortionist or lone-wolf
terrorist may launch or threaten a ‘Dr. Evil’ (New Line
Cinema, 1997–2002) style attack on SRM operations – i.e.
one conducted with no rational regard to the global
negative consequences. Nevertheless, we regard such a
scenario as inherently unlikely – the necessary combina-
tion of single-point vulnerability and concentrated personal
power is almost certain not to exist. However, the above is
not true for balloon-and-hose systems, which are particu-
larly vulnerable.
2.1.3 States
In common with terrorist groups, states represent nations
and peoples – albeit with acknowledged legitimacy, in
most cases (Thomas, 1999). Accordingly, the same forces
that may motivate terrorists to act to redress perceived
inequities may also motivate states. However, states differ
from terrorists in three obvious ways: They are more
identiﬁable as coherent organisations; ordinarily more
accountable to their peoples; and they are generally both
more technologically sophisticated and economically
capable. States are thus generally more able to muster
the means for an effective attack; and yet they are generally
more constrained in their practical ability to launch one
(militarily, diplomatically, and politically) – as a result of
their ability to suffer consequences in a backlash (sanc-
tions, retaliatory strikes, etc.). This leads to a bifurcation
into two potential types of state threat. First, an overtly-
attacking state must be in a position of great strength (or
great desperation). Secondly, even a weak state may be
capable of mounting a covert operation, disguised as
terrorism. Indeed, there is generally a fairly blurred line
between state action and terrorism – with recent examples
including Iran’s Hezbollah (US Department of State, 2016)
proxy and Russian ‘volunteers’ or ‘little green men’
(Shevchenko, 2014) in Ukraine. Multiple branches of a
state may be capable of engaging in such actions (Kibbe,
2007), which may be carried out in contravention of the
aggressor’s domestic law prohibiting such actions (Kibbe,
2012).
2.2 Threat timings
The nature of an SRM program is such that, once incepted,
it is difﬁcult and disruptive to unwind quickly. This is
largely due to the real risk of termination shock, but also
because of the increasing operational and organisational
robustness that comes from full establishment. Addition-
ally, ongoing acquiescence to any given program tends to
ultimately morph into tacit permission – which constitutes
one form of social licensing process (as opposed to e.g. an
explicit treaty). These issues make the start point of the
program an obvious time for a threat to manifest itself.
After a decade or so, the risk of termination shock is likely
to outweigh any beneﬁt to an opponent – even a
disadvantaged one. However, it is not sufﬁcient to assume
rational behavior in this regard – and ongoing vigilance
would be required. If the perception took hold (falsely or
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otherwise) that SRM was not a public good (Morrow,
2014), then it may be seen simply as a high-proﬁle and
relatively soft target. In such circumstances, an opportu-
nistic attack could result in signiﬁcant environmental and
economic damage, and a major public victory for the
attackers (albeit perhaps a Pyric one). If, for example, a
full-scale SRM program was deployed by balloon (Robock
et al., 2009), its total destruction could be relatively easily
achieved (by any moderately competent attacker able to
gain access to the tether ground point). N.B. Security is one
strong counter-argument against balloon-and-hose sys-
tems, unless they are built with signiﬁcant overcapacity
and redundancy.
Weather events blamed on SRM, or unrelated geopoli-
tical matters, may similarly serve to trigger tensions to
erupt. One later-stage attack scenario would involve
geoengineering as a ﬂashpoint to an existing geopolitical
crisis. The idea that SRM is ‘being done to us’ could offer a
lightning rod to existing concerns – as it may well be
perceived as a violation of sovereignty, particularly to a
state perceiving itself as a ‘loser’ (correctly or otherwise)
(Whyte, 2012).
Furthermore, there is always a residual long-term risk of
an isolated individual launching a cyberattack or terrorist
operation – despite the risk of termination shock, and a
lack of support from a wider community. Anders Breivik
(Biography.com Editors, 2014) and the Unabomber
(Biography.com Editors, 2017) are examples of such
threats, which came largely as a surprise. Due to the
potential irrationality or deliberate destructiveness of such
attacks, there is no time horizon after which the threat from
such individuals can be entirely discounted.
2.3 Threat loci
SRM has, by its nature, an extended supply chain. Unless
carried out in an end-to-end secure environment (e.g. by
the military), unsophisticated attacks are possible at a
range of locations in the supply chain. Such attacks
potentially include vulnerable, unconventional and highly-
personal targets (Ward and Morris, 2006) – including
worker’s families. While militarisation of SRM has been
discussed (Nightingale and Cairns, 2014), civilian models
for operation have also been considered (Lockley, 2016). It
should be noted that modern state functions are frequently
outsourced to private ﬁrms, which may be far less secure
than equivalent military-led counterpart operations. Pilots
and staff (or their families); ground facilities and airstrips;
aircraft; and logistics for fuel, spares, and the chemicals
supply chain are all possible targets.
Airports and airbases tend to be reasonably secure
locations, but the extended nature of the supply chain
means that security is often difﬁcult outside of the base.
Personnel can, in extremis, be housed in secure acco-
mmodation – leading to a quasi-military environment.
Supply chains are difﬁcult to secure generally, unless
logistics are exclusively by air, sea, or by protected road
convoys. The cost of securing supply chains can be
disproportionate to the cost of launching attacks. For
example, occasional small arms ﬁre can be enough to
mandate permanent use of armoured vehicles and armed
escorts. Even unarmed protestors can easily damage or
obstruct vehicles, leading to severe disruption (Smith,
2015). Likewise, most suppliers will not have the
preparations to enable any serious defense against targeted
physical or cyber threats, and particularly those directed
against staff. In extremis, a long-term pattern of attacks
could mandate the construction of a secure supply chain –
raising costs enormously.
Non-military aircraft in ﬂight are, in principle, vulner-
able. However, the range of threats is limited. Aircraft are
generally reasonably well-protected against cyber attack
(although successful attacks are not unknown (Norman,
2011)), and the range of possible actors capable of
launching a kinetic attack on airborne aircraft is limited
by the technological sophistication required (even man-
portable guided air-defense systems are not commonly
available to non-state actors). Furthermore, this technolo-
gical sophistication makes tracing the hostile actor
inherently easier than tracing a ground attack – thus
tending to force any attack ‘into the open’. This makes
missile attacks on ﬂying aircraft an option open only to
desperate or powerful states. Nevertheless, even a one-off
attack of this nature would be a clear act of escalation,
which may serve an important political signaling purpose.
Such a scenario could perhaps be most easily be envisaged
were a less powerful state (e.g. Bangladesh) to attempt to
geoengineer in deﬁance of a superpower.
There is, nevertheless, a potential threat to airborne
aircraft from readily-available (and hence untraceable)
simple weapons – but only when ﬁred from close to the
airbase. Commonly-available man-portable weapons, such
as machine guns and RPGs, are only effective at very short
range. Accordingly, keeping a signiﬁcant secure zone
beyond the runway is helpful in ensuring such attacks
cannot be mounted. More sophisticated weapon systems,
such as the SA-18 Igla, are much less widely available –
and run a high risk of being traced to an attacking state.
2.4 Threat types
We consider a range of threat types: Kinetic attack; cyber
attack; and civil protest. We consider (where appropriate)
effectiveness, cost, likelihood, actors, and other criteria.
The degree to which these threats are likely, or effective,
will change according to the precise nature of the
program’s engineering choices – e.g. aerostats vs. planes,
or MCB boats vs. SAI. Therefore, our analysis should not
be seen as binding or deﬁnitive.
Before discussing individual threat types in detail, it is
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worth considering the purpose of any attack. This may
range from a simple protest – without serious attempts at
disruption. Examples could include ﬁring warning shots,
or the symbolic destruction of non-critical assets (e.g.
ﬂagpoles). The next escalation would be an attack
designed to cause temporary or symbolic loss of capability,
so as to fully demonstrate destructive power – e.g.
downing a single aircraft. Finally, an attack may involve
the complete destruction of capacity, necessitating a
comprehensive rebuild. This could include a simultaneous
cyber-hijack of all aircraft (forcing them to crash), or
simultaneous intensive bombing of all airbases and
factories.
In all likelihood, any tactical attack would likely be
backed up by a diplomatic strategy. Save for a willingness
to engage in either repeated military action or an enduring
military occupation, it would be unlikely that any
determined geoengineering program could be permanently
halted by hostile action. A country facing annihilation from
rising seas would potentially be very determined in its
efforts – and would likely garner considerable external
support against an aggressor. Any attack is therefore likely
to have the threefold aims of temporary interruption; an
increase to cost and risk for the geoengineering country;
and an attempt to force negotiations (either directly, or via
a ‘good cop’ proxy nation).
2.4.1 Kinetic attack
The most obvious form of attack is kinetic – from bullets,
bombs, missiles, etc. In principle, this threat type is serious
– but a swift analysis of the likely behavior of potential
hostile actors suggests that it is perhaps less probably than
may be intuitively expected. Nevertheless, it is worth
exploring the range of options open to a potential attacker.
Airbases can potentially be directly attacked. However,
they are likely to be located in friendly territory – typically
beyond the range of naval guns. Accordingly, airstrikes
(from planes or cruise missiles), or a clandestine/special
forces attack are likely to be the only options. An airstrike
would be such a provocative act that it would be likely only
as an option for the most powerful actors (e.g. a
superpower), or a desperate state facing a perceived
existential threat.
A clandestine attack could be used against an airbase,
and indeed terrorist/special forces (Winterman, 2011)
attacks are typically considered a signiﬁcant risk to
airbases – which have long perimeters, low occupancy
levels, and distributed assets within. However, there are
other options for such an attack, which incur far less risk to
the attacker – albeit lacking the spectacular nature of an
airbase attack. The supply chain is the most obvious place
to launch a kinetic attack – with road transport and civilian
suppliers being particularly vulnerable.
Airborne aircraft are in principle vulnerable– particu-
larly considering that practical ﬂight plans will likely cross
national borders or international waters, as injection
patterns must straddle the equator (Kravitz et al., 2017),
or be close to it (Kleinschmitt et al., 2018). It is unlikely
that the tanker-type aircraft needed would be able to
conduct any credible defense against kinetic attack,
save for anti-missile systems (Staff, 2015). However,
any attack may have to be carried out relatively close to
the airbase – as the planes would be extremely high-ﬂying
(McClellan et al., 2012) (albeit perhaps for only part of
their ﬂight). Only the most capable ground-to-air or
air-to-air systems would be capable of hitting them at
operational altitude. Nevertheless, the regular ﬂight
locations and plans make airbase locations relatively
vulnerable to shoulder-launched missiles (Millar, 2003).
However, as discussed before capable missiles are likely to
be traceable, as they are not widely available (Crile, 2007)
– although attack attribution may not be without some
degree of wriggle-room (Miller, 2016). The potentially
limited geographic range needed for distribution means
that air operations could be carried out entirely within
‘friendly’ territory – thus making a kinetic operation
against aircraft essentially limited to an overt and risky
military attack. The only exception to this near-invulner-
ability within friendly territory is a potential low-tech
attack on or near the ground (which is predicated on close
access, and therefore on poor base security).
2.4.2 Cyberattack
Cyberwarfare has been deﬁned as “actions by a nation-
state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks
for the purposes of causing damage or disruption” (Clarke,
2010). However, alternative deﬁnitions exist – which may
be broader in scope (Arquilla, 1999). A range of different
potential cyberattacks may be conducted. Examples
include hijacking industrial controls, to execute the
physical destruction of a system (Kelley, 2013); or less
direct forms of attack, such as deletion of data or leaking of
sensitive information. Personnel can also be attacked by
means of doxing, if identiﬁcation poses a risk to them.
Cyberattacks are a threat type available to a wide range
of actors. Potentially all parties have access to cyberattack
capabilities – from a lone-wolf activist or blackmailer,
right up to a nation state (BBC News, 2007). The
advantages of a cyberattack are myriad. Often inexpensive,
they can be assembled and conducted in a clandestine
fashion. The identity of the actors may be unknown – even
after the event (Kelley, 2013). Furthermore, cyberwarfare
even offers the opportunity to disguise the fact of the
attack. For example, a plane can potentially be forced to
crash (AFB, 2015) – but with the cause of the crash
potentially disguised to look like an unrelated problem.
This gives an attacker a substantial advantage when it
comes to prolonging their capability to launch attacks.
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2.4.3 Civil protest
Civil protest is multifaceted. It can manifest itself as lawful
political and media campaigning; through disruptive but
lawful public protests; up to signiﬁcant or violent civil
unrest (Schock, 2013; BBC News, 2000). The extent of
this spectrum, and the range of possible actors and targets,
are at the core of the difﬁculty of tackling this challenge.
While it is not within the scope of this paper to address the
‘threat’ from political campaigning, we seek to address
other aspects. Physical methods typical of civil protest
include pickets, blockades, and (in some cases) rioting.
This can raise security costs (Serck, 2016), disrupt
operations, trigger the withdrawal of suppliers, and
severely intimidate personnel. One possible solution to
the risks of civil protest is to move facilities to remote
locations, but that may simply divert the threat further up
the supply chain. As with other physical threats, the road
transport supply lines to airbases are a key vulnerability
(Wilson, 2010). Unlike with kinetic threats, civil protests
are likely to be concentrated at the gate – this being a
prominent focus for pickets, protests and demonstrations.
Civil protest typically aims to be as open and confronta-
tional as possible, and the gate (or headquarters) provides
the most obvious focus for this. The boundaries between
civil environmental protest and criminality/terrorism are
sometimes blurred (Maas et al., 2013). Additionally, the
most capable civil protest groups are potentially able to
launch sophisticated cyberattacks on operations, and others
can deploy more basic cyberattacks on personnel (Quod-
ling, 2015). Such supplementary attacks can be expected to
be both synchronous and asynchronous with protests.
2.5 State vs private contractors
The use of private contractors is common as a way of
discharging the responsibilities of a modern state. In such a
situation, applied to SRM, it is to be expected that a
contractor (if overtly employed) would have the full
blessing and protection of the commissioning state. Indeed,
a full operational and legal model exists from the military:
Contractors on Deployed Operations (CONDO) (Moore
and Antill, 2011). However, an alternative model exists –
where private ﬁrms are fully responsible for the SRM
process, and the state is uninvolved. The result of the latter
relationship may be that the state’s protection is supplied
reluctantly, or not at all. For example, the responses of
states to the threat of piracy on the high seas differ
markedly – with the US offering an entirely uncompromis-
ing approach (Sheikh and Guled, 2009), as distinct from
that of other ﬂags. The degree to which a private SRM
operator can expect security protection from the state
depends on a range of factors, such as legality, personal
connections to power brokers, physical location, etc. A
detailed case-by-case evaluation would be needed, before
conclusions could be drawn.
2.6 Legal protection
As a novel activity, it is possible that SRM may be subject
to a range of legal challenges and uncertainties. While not a
security threat as such, any doubts regarding the lawfulness
of SRM offers an opportunity for cover for attacks –
whether legitimate or otherwise. Similar doubts about the
lawfulness of operations have been used by opponents of
conventional (O’Shaughnessy, 1996) and nuclear weapons
(Schlosser, 2015) to mount kinetic attacks on these
systems. Furthermore, legal uncertainty may result in
dithering by the state– under whose protection the SRM
operation supposedly lies.
2.7 Ocean operation
One option for SRM operations is to host them at sea.
Indeed, there is a precedent for controversial processes
being conducted in international waters (Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2016). This
approach renders the operation far more secure against
civil protest or terrorism than would a land-based
operation. However, unless conducted from a fully-
protected military aircraft carrier (at great expense), the
ability of states to move military assets freely into the
theater of operations means that providing military security
potentially becomes much more difﬁcult – with submarine
threats particularly difﬁcult to anticipate, prevent or react
to. Furthermore, the range of aircraft available for carrier-
borne operations are greatly restricted – and special aircraft
types may need to be developed to support this approach.
A compromise strategy may be the conduct of operations
from isolated island airbases (which are akin to large,
moored aircraft carriers) – such as Diego Garcia or
Ascension Island. The former offers a convenient, near-
equatorial location (7 degrees south) – allowing access to
both Northern and Southern hemispheres. An additional
beneﬁt of islands is that they have exclusive littoral rights –
as distinct from carriers, which lack such a legal perimeter.
They are also generally invulnerable to deniable submarine
attacks; any submarine-launched cruise missiles are likely
to leave identiﬁable fragments. Overall, ocean islands are
therefore very attractive places to locate SRM operations.
One advantage of ocean operations is that location can
be precisely controlled – set purely by scientiﬁc means,
rather than working around the political and logistical
considerations necessary when locating airbases. This has
the potential to reduce ﬂight times, and potentially
chemical usage – thus controlling operating costs and
(by reducing aircraft numbers) also capital costs. Accord-
ingly, this offers a trade-off with the increased costs
associated with ocean operations.
A brief mention is merited here of Marine Cloud
Brightening (MCB) – although this is not generally the
subject of this paper, it is taken seriously as an SRM
technique. This may be carried out by autonomous drone
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ships, which can operate using renewable energy for
extended periods of time (Shepherd, 2009). This approach
gives a range of inherent security advantages. The use of a
large ﬂeet of small ships means that a very comprehensive
operation would be needed to destroy or disable them
using kinetic operation, once they were deployed. Even
ﬁnding and accessing them in a large ocean theater of
operations would be very challenging. This strategy
therefore, appears to offer inherent security advantages.
However, there are also inherent disadvantages. The ships
themselves are highly vulnerable to kinetic attack – unless
designed with armour, a suite of sensors, and perhaps
defensive weaponry that would dramatically increase their
cost. Additionally, the use of a fully-autonomous system
leaves a degree of vulnerability to cyberattack inherent–
unless the ships were not subject to any direct remote
control, or other remote systems access (an unlikely
scenario). Avariety of strategies are available to a potential
cyber-attacker. Vessels could be programmed to ram each
other; reverse their bilge pumps, causing them to sink;
maneuver into storms or ice ﬂoes; shut down; falsely report
activity and position; etc. One downside of marine cloud
brightening is that termination shock would onset in a
matter of days, should the system be interrupted – although
this would be buffered by the ocean’s heat capacity and
mixing.
2.8 Defensive strategies
We consider the following defensive strategies: Redun-
dancy; heterogeneity; overcapacity; inventory depth;
logistics hardening; operation shrinkage; covert opera-
tions; cyber security; (counter) intelligence; physical
security; and multilateralism.
2.8.1 Redundancy
Redundancy through replication is key to ensuring
resilience – removing single points of failure. Balloon-
and-hose systems are particularly vulnerable, in this regard
– inherently being singular or few in number, and being of
a highly-specialized type (i.e. one with replicated vulner-
abilities). Even the provision of multiple entrance gates to
an airbase is an important strategy to improve resistance to
a variety of attacks (ambush; civil protest; sniping; etc.).
The location of airbases in a globally distributed manner is
likely to make good sense from an operational point of
view, regardless of any security risk. Floods, storms, and
civil disruption are a potential issue regardless of location –
and a more distributed strategy engenders resilience (a
doctrine known as ‘Force Dispersal’ (Dunnigan, 2003)).
When added to this mix, security concerns add an
additional reason to remove any single points of failure.
Moreover, the beneﬁt of having distributed airbases adds
more security value than might perhaps be assumed – as air
assets can potentially be redistributed at short notice.
2.8.2 Heterogeneity
An aspect of redundancy that can be regarded as a separate
defensive strategy is heterogeneity. A distribution system
that relies on any one technology, item of equipment, etc.
has an inherent vulnerability. Security threats affecting one
necessarily affect all – and this extends to more mundane
issues, such as safety recalls.
2.8.3 Overcapacity
Beyond the strategy of reducing the presence of single
points of failure, there is an additional need for a
generalized overcapacity and/or redundancy (Liu et al.,
2013) at most or all points in the system. Each system stage
should ideally be operating at well below capacity. This
helps to guarantee operational integrity in the face of a
wide variety of issues – including security threats. There is
both a direct and indirect (deterrent) effect in this regard.
Any single points of failure are inherently vulnerable to an
attack – risking the whole program. Furthermore, the
presence of obvious redundant overcapacity makes hostile
operations much less appealing – as even a successful
attack may have little or no operational impact. For optimal
results, a redundancy strategy should consider a variety of
macroscopic geo-political threats. For example, locating
airbases in countries with a range of political afﬁliations
and economic situations may be helpful. For example, it is
unlikely that South Korea, Cuba and Saudi Arabia will all
experience closely-aligned economic, social and political
shocks at the same time. Nevertheless, the selection of
unstable countries is unlikely to be beneﬁcial.
2.8.4 Inventory depth and resilience
The attractiveness of any attack tends to be inﬂuenced by
the ability of such an attack to cause disruption and
disablement of operations. Conducting an attack, espe-
cially on a long and poorly-defended supply chain, is likely
to be relatively easy. However, sustaining any such an
attack is likely to be difﬁcult – as defenders can readily
adapt to repetitious attacks. Accordingly, inventory depth
(Lyons, 2014) and site resilience are key to sustaining
operations. Strategies for achieving this are relatively
simple. The most basic is keeping adequate supplies of
fuel, spares and chemicals on deployment sites to ‘ride out’
an extended period of supply disruption – possibly of the
order of years, for less readily-available inventory. Like-
wise, utility resources can be made resilient by the use of
renewable site power, water boreholes, etc. Furthermore,
the ability to house pilots and other essential personnel on
site for extended periods of time not only adds resilience
generally but also particularly reduces vulnerability to
unsophisticated attacks. In addition, further resilience can
be added in more imaginative ways: Simplifying inven-
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tories, to reduce the range of items needing to be held; and
having the capacity to improvise repairs using a machine
shop or 3D printer, rather than waiting for deliveries. A
tension exists between the beneﬁts of reduced inventory
complexity and the need to avoid homogeneity of
equipment (for both type-approval and security reasons).
2.8.5 Logistics hardening
Extended or convoluted supply lines are vulnerable to a
wide range of attacks from diverse actors (Bichou et al.,
2013; Bichou et al., 2014). Additionally, they may
experience an associated multitude of non-adversarial
threats – resistance to which may be classed as resilience
(Lam and Dai, 2015), as opposed to security. Accordingly,
minimising the use of road transport offers both a strategic
and tactical advantage. The main bulk supplies to an
airbase, other than utilities, are fuel and chemicals. Major
airports already beneﬁt from pipelined fuel supplies, and
similar facilities can be developed for importing chemicals
(although sulfur needs to be melted for pipeline transport,
or transported as a powder or compound). Buried pipelines
are hard to trace and attack, and multiple ﬁlling points give
redundancy. In extremis, supplies can be airlifted in.
Notably, MCB does not rely on continual supplies of
materials or (potentially) even fuel.
2.8.6 Operational shrinkage
Smaller operations give a smaller attack surface (Mana-
dhata andWing, 2004). For example, the use of drones will
remove risks posed to and by aircrew. (Paradoxically,
however, the freedom to attack without casualties may
greatly reduce the political, legal and ethical hurdle for an
attacker.) Likewise, the use of pre-programmed or
artiﬁcial-intelligence-controlled ﬂight routes will reduce
the risks posed by communications jamming or hacking.
Development of technologies that require lower chemical
ﬂuxes, fewer ﬂights, etc. all give opportunities to further
reduce the attack surface.
2.8.7 Covert or conﬁdential operations
Covert operations (Daugherty, 2010; Downes and Lilley,
2010) are an established tool of warfare. There is no need
for SRM operations to be overt. Aircraft used can be
mingled with conventional trafﬁc, and can use markings
and ﬂightpaths that do not serve to distinguish them.
Furthermore, supply chains can be mixed up with a range
of unrelated logistics ﬂows – especially for non-bulk
inventory, such as parts. This makes it not only more
difﬁcult to launch an attack, but also less fruitful. For
example, destruction of a mixed load of road cargo would
only result in a small amount of damage to an SRM
operation. Any lack of dedication in operations greatly
raises the risks of collateral damage – potentially alienating
otherwise supportive or neutral factions, in the event of an
attack. Consider, for example, the (ﬂawed) suggestion of
attaching SRM equipment to airliners (Laakso et al., 2012)
(not in itself covert). Such a policy would greatly raise the
stakes for any attacker – as can be seen from the
tremendous difﬁculties that accidental ‘shoot downs’
cause for even the greatest powers (Kuypers et al., 1994).
One approach to making operations covert is to adapt the
military principle of ‘shoot and scoot’ (US Army, 2014). In
principle, an SRM aircraft can land at any ordinary airport.
It can quickly be resupplied and relaunched, with a new
crew if needed. In such a model, there is no ‘base’ of
operations to attack. This style of operations may have a
range of operational advantages, as well as reducing
vulnerabilities to certain types of attack. For example, the
ability to adapt ﬂight plans to use inexpensive landing
slots; and the potential cost savings available from
avoiding the need for a permanent base. However, civilian
airports are unlikely to accept any signiﬁcantly increased
security threat – which SRM operations may bring.
It is notable that covert operations can feed mistrust and
conspiracy theories – as is abundantly evident from the
persistent “chemtrails” conspiracy theory (Bakalaki, 2016;
Cairns, 2016). There remains a signiﬁcant difference
between a program which is fully secret in nature, and
one that is simply restricted in terms of operational detail.
The latter is good practice, the former is unlikely to be
sustainable in the long run. Governments are not good at
keeping large-scale operations secret for long periods
(Fenster, 2014).
2.8.8 Cybersecurity
Inevitably, providing a proper program of cybersecurity
management (Kohnke et al., 2016) a necessary, but not
sufﬁcient, security response. Most cybersecurity comes
down to simple good practice: ensuring mission-critical
systems (e.g. avionics, process control (Macaulay and
Singer, 2011; Instrumentation.co.za, 2007)) are kept
separate from peripheral IT assets (e.g. website hosting);
ensuring software is patched properly; ﬁrewall and anti-
virus implementation; training staff on good security
discipline; and (in extremis) air-gapping (Zetter, 2014)
(completely disconnecting mission-critical IT from the
wider internet). Nevertheless, it must be recognized that
cybersecurity does not exist in isolation from other threats.
A cyberattack (e.g. a leak of personnel ﬁles) may be the
precursor to another attack type (e.g. kinetic attack, such as
an assassination). In the case of more sophisticated
cyberattacks (e.g. those with state sponsorship, or similar
resourcing), a more sophisticated response is potentially
required (e.g. a counterattack). Such interventions are
outside the scope of this paper. Again, it must be
recognized that the supply chain must be considered as
carefully as the core operation.
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2.8.9 Intelligence and counter intelligence
The major classes of intelligence (Keegan, 2003) are
HUMINT (human sources – e.g. spies), IMINT (imaging
intelligence – e.g. photography) and SIGINT (signals – e.g.
phone taps). These are supplemented by other sources,
such as OSINT (open source intelligence – e.g. websites),
MASINT (measurement and signature intelligence – e.g.
passive infrared detectors) and TECHINT (technical
intelligence, e.g. weapon ranges). As should be obvious
from the above, intelligence is a broad ﬁeld – and generally
beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, brieﬂy listing
a few techniques is helpful in guiding further consideration
of the subject.
Counter-intelligence (Prunckun, 2012) measures are an
important way to deny an enemy the opportunity to mount
an attack. Examples include:
a. Hide-from-view screens (IMINT). Simply obscuring
bases from direct view helps prevent enemy imaging. This
can, for example, prevent identiﬁcation of personnel and
targeting of weapons. The use of camouﬂage and decoys is
a related technique.
b. Pseudo-random timetables (various). Regular opera-
tions allow predictability for an attacker. Preventing this
prediction using randomness can help disrupt attack plans.
c. Concealing countermeasures (TECHINT, others as
applicable). For example, keeping secret the existence of
anti-missile Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) systems
on aircraft.
d. Screening (HUMINT). Carefully screening opera-
tional personnel to ensure they do not pose a risk, either to
operations (Sawer, 2015) or to security (Evans, 2015) is
critical. Elimination of unnecessary job roles may be a
superior approach to improved screening. Even designing-
out the need for support staff (caterers, cleaners, etc.) can
improve security, by reducing the attack surface.
e. Non-disclosure (OSINT). Placing unnecessary infor-
mation into the public domain may result in an increased
risk of attack. For example, listing staff names, building
addresses, etc. leaves a trail of evidence that can be used to
inform an attack.
Active intelligence operations may be incorporated into
all SRM operations, as an essential part of security. In the
case of civil protest, intelligence examples (provided for
illustration, not as recommendation) include:
a. Inﬁltration of protest groups (HUMINT). This can be
as simple as turning up to public meetings, or befriending/
bribing sources.
b. Monitoring base perimeter (MASINT). For example,
tracking the presence of mobile phones outside the base;
using passive infrared detectors to detect intrusion
attempts.
c. Photographing demonstrators (IMINT).
d. Perimeter-setting (TECHINT). Setting base peri-
meters to ensure that aircraft are clear of locally-available
weapons.
e. Monitoring protestor communications (SIGINT/
OSINT).
f. Monitoring protest group websites and general press
activity (OSINT).
It should be borne in mind that, while passive counter-
intelligence is routine, the same cannot be said for active
intelligence gathering. Intelligence gathering on civil
society is especially controversial – and the more invasive
types are especially seen as being problematic. For
example, CCTV on a base perimeter would widely be
seen as reasonable – whereas trailing or bugging
demonstrators is likely to be seen as far more controversial.
General recommendations on intelligence gathering cannot
realistically be made in the absence of an understanding of
the particular threat landscape faced by an operator. As a
ﬁnal note, there is also the issue of public relations. If overt
or suspected intelligence and counter-intelligence activities
are seen as being a sign of imperiousness, then they may
galvanise protest. Comparably, the arguable militarisation
of policing is not without controversy and detraction (Hall
and Coyne, 2013).
2.8.10 Physical defense
Physical defense must match the threat type. The less
sophisticated the threat, the simpler the defenses capable of
providing resistance. The simplest passive defenses
(fences, walls etc.) are among the most effective, offering
good protection against a range of intelligence and kinetic
threats. While operations may be conducted from civil
airports (which have their own security literature and
processes (Sweet, 2009)), the use of military airﬁelds or
dedicated geoengineering airbases offer a general step up
in security (at least in peacetime, in the case of military
airﬁelds). It is sensible to locate bases in areas that are both
military secure (e.g. out of the range of naval guns), and
sufﬁciently remote to be able to be easily screened from
disruptive civil protest. As discussed earlier, the lower-
sophistication attacks are the larger risk, and therefore a
basic but robust defensive strategy is sensible. In general,
the larger the area controlled around the airbase’s
operational core, the harder it is to effectively attack. A
larger area means concentric fences can be used to increase
security. Additionally, targeting basic weapons becomes
far more difﬁcult at increasing range. The need for physical
defense may extend up the supply chain – which can be
vastly more complex and expensive than securing a single
site.
Depending on the degree of threat, and the degree of
militarisation deemed acceptable, a range of active
defenses may be used. These could conceivably include
both ECM systems (e.g. communication jammers) and
kinetic systems. Surface kinetic defenses may include anti-
missile missile systems, such as Iron Dome; and gun
systems, such as Goalkeeper and Phalanx (guns ordinarily
cannot be deployed near civilians, due to the risk of
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collateral damage). Operation from existing military bases
makes such defenses available, without additional expense
or policy concerns. Aircraft themselves can potentially
carry jammers and ﬂares, to confound inbound missiles. It
is even conceivable that aircraft could be armed with air-to-
air missiles, but this would serve to militarise the program.
Any ship-borne operations may additionally have to
monitor and defend against the threat from submarines –
the existence of which would make operating within a
military battle group essential.
2.8.11 A comment on multilateralism
Multilateralism’s central principle is the “opposition [of]
bilateral discriminatory arrangements that were believed to
enhance the leverage of the powerful over the weak and to
increase international conﬂict” (Kahler, 1992). Perhaps the
most effective defense to a range of threats is a consensual,
multilateral process. The more individuals, countries and
groups feel that they are represented within the decision-
making process (analogous both to procedural justice
(Hough et al., 2013) and representative government
(Barker, 2013)), the more that they are likely to feel they
are best served by working with the decision-making
system, rather than against it – they will tend to see
provision of SRM as a public good, even if beneﬁts are not
homogeneous or even universal (as opposed to disruption
of rogue SRM itself being seen as a public good). The
distribution of operations, and of decision-making, across a
range of actor countries may be the best way to
demonstrate that communities around the world feel that
they are ‘part of the process’ – be that through political or
economic involvement. This bears comparison to a
‘coalition of the willing’ (Baum, M A, 2013; Johns and
Davies, 2014). This may not be the least-cost option; and
may increase the theoretical attack surface, albeit while
generally improving redundancy. Nevertheless, the effect
in defusing opposition may yield disproportionate beneﬁts.
Furthermore, the broader the coalition, the more powerful
their collective military forces. Nevertheless, this approach
is not without potential pitfalls, and a power bloc may
emerge that can impose its will on others (Ricke et al.,
2010). Appropriate institutional architectures for control-
ling the issues arising from this ‘free driver’ problem have
been considered by other authors (Weitzman, 2015). While
noting the importance of effective governance mechan-
isms, we note the broad scope of such investigation, and its
active investigation by other authors. Accordingly, it falls
generally outside the scope of this work.
3 Conclusions
We discuss a range of threat types, actors and vulner-
abilities. While it is impossible to predict with certainty the
security threats to SRM operations, we nevertheless make
the following broad-brush observations:
We consider the threat type risks as follows:
a. Civil protest is almost inevitable – but is unlikely to
pose any lasting material threat to SRM operations. It may,
however, greatly increase operational difﬁculties and costs
– especially around logistics. Furthermore, it opens
operations to additional political pressure. Societal unrest
is an overlapping, but indirect threat – which invites
simultaneous scrutiny.
b. Overt military attacks on airbases or aircraft are
possible, although unlikely. While the airbases and aircraft
themselves may be vulnerable in principle, they are
protected by the envelope of security offered by the
state. The doctrine on non-aggression offers signiﬁcant
protection – and even powerful states are generally
unwilling to carry out overt military attacks, especially
on other capable states. Even private companies conduct-
ing SRM would reasonably expect to operate within the
general envelope of a state’s military security. The only
likely attack scenario is a superpower aiming to ‘teach a
lesson’ to a far less powerful state, which is permitting or
conducting operations in ongoing deﬁance of the more
powerful state’s wishes.
c. Cyber attacks are highly likely, to the point of being
inevitable. The key uncertainty is the degree of sophistica-
tion. While DDoS attacks, website hacking, etc. are to be
expected, they are largely inconsequential. By contrast,
process attacks (causing aircraft to crash, chemicals to
leak, etc.) are far more serious. A lone wolf hacker, or
protest group, may be capable of mounting such an attack.
However, it is far more likely that such a sophisticated
attack will come covertly from a state – or a party with
similar resources. A robust program of cyber defense is
therefore necessary throughout the supply chain.
d. Covert kinetic attacks – whether from quasi-terrorist
groups, or from states – are a serious risk. The less
sophisticated the attack, the better the cover offered by a
wide range of potential culprits – making simpler attacks
far more likely. Accordingly, physical and intelligence
defenses should be concentrated on the simplest threats:
small arms ﬁre, arson, etc.
We consider the threat locus risks as follows:
a. Aircraft in ﬂight have the least risk, in totality. They
are, however, highly vulnerable to a determined military
attack – should one occur. Good base security, and a large
perimeter area will help prevent unsophisticated attacks on
aircraft that are on or near the ground.
b. Bases and ground operations are somewhat vulner-
able to kinetic attack; but are far more likely to experience
low-grade attacks from civil protestors, such as blockades.
Military bases have existing general defenses.
c. By far the greatest weakness is the supply chain,
which necessarily includes chemicals, fuel, personnel and
spares. This chain can be hit at any point by civil
protestors, clandestine kinetic attackers, or cyberattacks.
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While supply chain attacks may not cause a lasting service
outage, they are nevertheless likely to cause very large cost
increases and operational disruption. However, such
attacks may lack the aesthetics and newsworthy nature of
a direct attack on SRM-speciﬁc bases, aircraft, etc.
We analyze threat timings, concluding that the vulner-
ability is greatly elevated in the early stages of operation.
Accordingly, an uneventful launch bodes well for a future
free of attacks.
Nevertheless, we recommend the following defensive
measures for SRM operations generally:
a. Basic physical security – ensuring bases and overt
supply chain elements are given at least a minimum level
of physical security. Relative remoteness (e.g. in deserts or
on islands) and a politically-stable environment of
operation offer signiﬁcant advantages. An alternative
strategy is to distribute operations widely throughout
existing civilian infrastructure – diluting the value of any
one target (this relies on the acquiescence of civil airport
operators).
b. Redundant operations – replicating capacity in a
number of locations, and with excess resources. This
redundancy should be designed to ensure that similar
threats do not tend to impact multiple assets at the same
time. For this reason, we caution against the use of balloon-
and-hose systems, particularly those with limited redun-
dancy.
c. Heterogeneous operations – a heterogeneous supply
chain should be used, ensuring that destruction or
unavailability of materials, spares, etc. (or non-hostile
safety and manufacturing issues) impact only a portion of
operations. Combined with redundancy, this will prevent
even a catastrophic loss of capability in one division, ﬁrm
or system from reducing total capacity below a threshold
level.
d. Resilient operations – for example: ensuring opera-
tions are sited in low-risk countries; that airbases are well
stocked and capable of operating with disrupted logistics
or access for extended periods of time; using well-proven
equipment; selecting easily-defensible bases.
e. Cybersecurity – a generally vigilant approach to
cybersecurity; in particular, ensuring that operational
systems are appropriately separated (air-gapped) from
publicly-accessible or peripheral systems.
f. Attack surface reduction – minimising the complexity
of the operational program, to reduce the extent of the
attack surface (e.g. using fewer ﬂights) and the potential
range of attacks that can be mounted (e.g. by switching
pilots for drones).
g. Conﬁdential, ﬂexible operations – limiting the
dissemination or predictability of information concerning
operation greatly reduces the attack surface. Releasing
ﬂight times, supply schedules and personnel information
(or allowing them to be observed or predicted) will greatly
aid potential attackers.
Notwithstanding the above, we note that the best defense
to all attacks is likely to be an inclusive, just, transparent
and fair decision-making process. This reduces or removes
incentives to attack.
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